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Sentencing Criminals:




Most jurisdictions around the country permit juries to consider victim
impact statements, statements taken from the family of a victim of violent
crime relating to the family's loss, during the sentencing phase of criminal
trials. In 1994, the Missouri Supreme Court followed this trend in State v.
Wise by approving the use of victim impact statements, and allowing the
statements to be presented to the jury at the sentencing stage of a capital
punishment trial.2
In non-capital punishment trials, the victim presents impact statements
relating to his economic loss, physical injury and changes in his personal
welfare In murder trials, the surviving family members present victim
impact statements relating to the effect of the crime on the victim's family.4
1. 879 S.W.2d 494 (Mo. 1994).
2. Id. at 516.
3. The Missouri statute which allows certain victim impact statements typifies
similar statutes of other states, the District of Columbia and the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and reads as follows:
A victim impact statement shall:
(1) Identify the victim of the offense;
(2) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense;
(3) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of
the offense, along with its seriousness and permanence;
(4) Describe any change in the victim's personal welfare or familial
relationships as a result of the offense;
(5) Identify any request for psychological services initiated by the
victim or the victim's family as a result of the offense; and
(6) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense
upon the victim that the court requires.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.762 (1994). See infra notes 74 and 77 for a comprehensive list
of state statutes which permit victim impact statements.
4. Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 515.
The American Bar Association Victims' Committee defines victim impact
statements as follows:
1
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As demonstrated by the United States Supreme Court's equivocal
position, the introduction of family impact evidence at the sentencing stage of
a murder trial remains very controversial. Regardingly, in 1991, the Court
overruled its precedent that victim impact statements violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by holding
that victim statements are constitutional in capital punishment cases.'
Despite the constitutionality of the introduction of a victim's family's
statements, the statements have been severely criticized for: (1) rendering the
sentencing of a criminal an arbitrary process; (2) imposing the death penalty
based on factors that were unknown to the defendant and irrelevant to the
defendant's decision to kill; and (3) misplacing the jury's attention on the
victim, instead of the defendant, at the sentencing stage of the trial.6
Notwithstanding the controversy, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the
prosecutor's use of victim impact statements in Wise by relying heavily on the
United States Supreme Court's constitutional approval of impact statements
in Payne v. Tennessee.
Prior to the sentencing of an offender in a serious case, victims or their
families should have the opportunity to inform the sentencing body of the
crime's physical, psychological and financial repercussions on the victim or
on the victim's family. Jurisdictions may do this in one or several ways,
including: (a) written statement prepared by the victim to be included in
the probation department's presentence report on the offender; (b) written
statement prepared by the probation department after consultation with the
victim of the victim's representative; and/or (c) oral statement by the
victim's representative before the sentencing body.
Patrick M. Fahey, Note, Payne v. Tennessee: An Eye For An Eye and Then Some, 25
CONN. L. REv. 205,211 n.32 (1992) (quoting VICTIMS COMMITTEE, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR FAIR TREATMENT OF CRIME VICTIMS AND WITNESSES
17-18 (1983) (guideline 11)).
5. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 811 (1991) ("A State may legitimately
conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the
victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty
should be imposed.") (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987) and South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989)).
6. Aida Alaka, Victim Impact Evidence, Arbitrariness, and the Death Penalty:
The Supreme Court Flipflops in Payne v. Tennessee, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 581, 582
n.7 (Spring 1992) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976)); See also Id.
at 597 nn.127-28 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 504-05 (1987)).
7., Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 515-16 (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 827).
[Vol. 60
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In 1972, Jessie Lee Wise, then eighteen years old, was sentenced to life
in prison after he pled guilty to and was convicted of first degree murder.'
Wise was later released on parole.9 In 1989, Wise was convicted of first-
degree murder, two counts of armed criminal action, stealing, and first-degree
robbery." The Circuit Court, St. Louis County, sentenced Wise to death and
the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed."
Wise was a maintenance worker at the condominiums where his victim,
Geraldine McDonald, lived.' 2 Wise occasionally washed and waxed
McDonald's red sports car.' 3  On the morning of August 27, 1988,
McDonald invited Wise into her condominium to discuss his washing her
car. 4 When McDonald refused to pay the price he demanded, Wise killed
her and took her money, jewelry, credit cards and BMW.'
Wise later confessed to the police that he killed McDonald. 6  After
hearing evidence of Wise's confession, and of his fingerprints in McDonald's
condominium and on her sports car, the jury convicted Wise of first degree
murder.' 7 The jury recommended the death penalty. 8
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed. 9 The court held that
when a defendant faces capital punishment, the prosecutor may refer to brief,
light and general victim impact statements from the victim's family during
sentencing."





13. Id at 502.
14. Id.
15. Id at 502, 503, 505.
16. Id. at 502.
17. Id, at 501-02.
18. Id. at 516. The prosecutor never read victim impact statements at trial
because the defense objected on the basis of Booth v. Maryland and South Carolina
v. Gathers. See State v. Wise, No. 583133 (St. Louis Circuit Court, St. Louis County,
Div. 19, March 15, 1989). The Missouri Supreme Court, however, has since used the
decision in Wise to uphold the use of victim impact statements in subsequent cases.
State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 926-27 (Mo. 1994), cert. denied, Parker v. Missouri,
115 S. Ct. 1827 (1995).
19. Id at 501.
20. Id, at 515-16.
3
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Victims' Rights Movement
The rise of the victims' rights movement started in the 1960's, in
conjunction with the women's rights movement's claim that the criminal
system mistreated rape victims." One premise behind both movements was
that for most crimes, there is at least one innocent victim whose life has been
harmed. Supporters of the movements contended that the criminal justice
system was entirely unsympathetic to victims by denying them a formal role
in the judicial system, exploiting them to prosecute the criminal, and failing
to provide rehabilitation or assistance after sentencing of the criminal.
Supporters advocated that the law should give victims a more meaningful role
in the criminal justice system.'
Accordingly, the victims' rights movement sought to accommodate the
needs of the victim and to balance the interests of the victim with the rights
of the defendant.' Supporters have achieved reform in various ways,
including the passage of state statutes requiring that the victim be informed of
the time and place of criminal proceedings" and the award of restitution to
victims.'
In addition to state legislation, Congress enacted the Uniform Victims of
Crime Act of 1992, which provides that the victim has: (1) the right to be
present whenever a defendant has the right to be present at a court proceeding
under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) the right
to be informed of the date, time and place of the trial; (3) the right to
counseling information; and (4) the right to be free from harm and
21. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Balancing Victim 's Rights and Vigorous Advocacyfor the
Defendant, 1989 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 135, 141 (1990). See also Fahey, supra note 4,
at 206 n.7 (citing Richard L. Aynes, Constitutional Considerations: Government
Responsibility and the Right Not To Be A Victim, 11 PEPP. L. REv. 63, 64 (1984) and
Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims' Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937, 949
(1985)).
22. Fahey, supra note 4, at 211.
23. Fahey, supra note 4, at 207 n.9 (citing Frank Carrington and George
Nicholson, Victims Rights: An Idea Whose Time Has Come-Five Years Later: The
Maturing of an Idea, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 1 (1989)); see also Yaroshefsky, supra note 21,
at 135-36 (examining the tension between protecting the victim and advocating the
defendant's constitutional rights).
24. A majority of states have statutes requiring that the victim be provided with
information regarding the trial, as well as information on counseling programs and
protection from harassment and intimidation. For a list of statutes, see infra notes 74
and 77.
25. See Fahey, supra note 4, at 211.
[Vol. 60
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harassment.26 Furthermore, these rights survive the victim and pass to the
victim's family upon the victim's death."
Congress also enacted the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 to
"enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the
criminal justice process."28 This Act amended the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to require the inclusion of victim impact as part of the presentence
report submitted to the sentencing authority.29
Victim impact evidence is one of the most controversial means of
vindicating victims' rights." Victim impact evidence, written statements or
oral testimony, allows victims or their families to tell the sentencer of the
crime's impact on their lives." Advocates of victim impact claim a two-fold
purpose for the statements: first, the victim gains a sense of dignity and
respect if allowed an active role in the sentencing decision; and second,
allowing victim impact will more effectively equate the criminal's punishment
to the full extent of the harm caused. 2
26. UNIF. VICTIMs OF CRIME ACT §§ 204, 205, 209 (Supp. 1994).
27. Id at § 218. The text of the Act, however, does not mention victim impact
statements. Id. at §§ 205-20.
28. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat.
1248, § 2(b)(1) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-15 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-80
(1982)). Pub. L. No. 98-473 § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984) amended §§ 3579-80
and relocated the sections to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663-64. In addition to victim impact
statements, the Victim and Witness Protection Act provides victims with restitution,
protection against intimidation and a federal "Son of Sam" law which prevents felons
from profiting from the sale of his or her story. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-15, 3663-64
(1988).
29. FED. R. CIM. P. 32(c)(2)(D). See also the Uniform Rules of Evidence which
are more restrictive than the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, providing that,
"[E]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of
peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor [is admissible for the purpose of
proving that the victim acted in conformity with his character on a particular
occasion]." UNIF. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (amended 1986) (emphasis added).
30. Fahey, supra note 4, at 211; see also Yaroshefsky, supra note 21, at 136
(suggesting alternatives to victim impact statements, which harm the defendant, such
as providing the victim an attorney throughout the trial in an attempt to give the victim
more dignity).
31. Fahey, supra note 4, at 211.
32. Id (citing Richard S. Murphy, Note, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth
v. Maryland and the Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1303, 1304 (1988)).
5
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B. Victim Impact Statements and the Eighth Amendment
Indicative of the United State Supreme Court's indecisiveness, courts and
legislatures around the nation have wavered on the issue of the
constitutionality of victim impact. In the 1980's, for example, four states
restricted the admissibility of victim statements to non-death penalty cases,33
and California banned victim impact statements in all criminal cases. 4
Currently, after Payne,3" some states restrict the admissibility of victim
statements to cases not involving the death penalty. 6 However, forty-nine
states allow victim statements taken from the victim, and most states allow
victim statements from a victim's family at the sentencing stage of criminal
trials. 7 In the 1987 death penalty case of Booth v. Maryland, the
United States Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of victim
impact statements taken from the family of a victim.38 Booth was convicted
of robbing and murdering an elderly couple and sentenced to death.39 Before
the sentencing stage of the trial, the prosecutor referred to a victim impact
33. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-1.1 (Harrison 1987); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 875(A)-(B) (West 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 982 (West 1986); S.C.
CODE ANN § 16-3-1550(A) (Law. Co-op 1987).
34. Fahey, supra note 4, at 213 n.73 (citing People v. Levitt, 203 Cal. Rptr. 276,
287-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)). See also infra note 63 and accompanying text for other
cases holding that victim impact statements were unconstitutional prior to their
constitutional approval by the Supreme Court.
35. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
36. Idaho statutorily provides for victim impact statements, but not in death
penalty cases. See State v. Bivens, 803 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (in the
absence of the death penalty, the court may consider victim impact statements during
sentencing); State v. Wersland, 873 P.2d 144, 146 (Idaho 1994) (impact statements
from victim's parents were admissible in a non-death penalty case) (citing IDAHO
CODE § 19-5306(1)(b)(3) (Supp. 1994)).
The Alabama and Nevada victim impact statutes do not provide for victim impact
statements taken from the victim's family, and presumably would not allow victim
impact statements in murder cases. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 26.3 (1993); NEV. REv.
STAT. § 176.145 (Supp. 1993).
Vermont does not have a statute addressing victim impact statements, but a 1993
Vermont Supreme Court case allowed victim impact statements from victims of sexual
assault. See State v. Densmore, 624 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Vt. 1993).
Hawaii does not have a statute or any case law addressing the constitutionality
of victim impact statements.
37. See infra note 74 for a list of state statutes that provide for victim impact
statements from both victims and their families.
38. Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991).
39. Id at 498.
[Vol. 60
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statement taken from an interview with the victims' son, daughter, son-in-law
and granddaughter.4"
The Court reversed Booth's death sentence,4 holding that victim impact
statements taken from a victim's family were contrary to the Eighth
Amendment provision that "cruel and unusual punishment [shall not be]
inflicted."42 The Court reasoned that if victim impact statements are allowed,
the sentencing body's focus is improperly placed on the victim, not on the
defendant; and, furthermore, the arbitrariness of a sentence would be enhanced
by victim impact, thereby constituting an impermissible risk.43 The Court
was "troubled by the implication that defendants whose victims were assets to
their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose victims
are perceived to be less worthy.""
Booth was, however, only a five-to-four majority decision.45 The
dissent in Booth focused primarily on the fact that the Maryland legislature
decided that the jury should be allowed to hear testimony from the victim's
family regarding the impact of the crime when weighing the degree of harm
the defendant caused in determining the degree of punishment to be inflicted
on the defendant.46 The dissent urged that "determinations of appropriate
sentencing considerations are, 'peculiarly questions of legislative policy."'47
Due to the Supreme Court's uncertainty, courts applied Booth in three
general ways. Some courts advocated a broad application of Booth and
banned victim statements altogether.48 Other courts attempted to distinguish
40. Id at 499. The victim impact statements that the prosecutor read to the jury
in Booth included statements by the victims' son that he felt like his parents were
"[b]utchered like animals ... [and he is] ... [f]earful for the first time in his life."
Id. at 499-500. The victim impact statements also included statements by the victims'
daughter that the murders have made her withdrawn and distrustful and that she suffers
from sleeplessness. She also stated her opinion that the defendant could not be
forgiven and could "[n]ever be rehabilitated." Id. at 500. The entirety of the victim
impact statements is reprinted in an appendix to the Court's decision. Id. at 509.
41. Id. at 501-02.
42. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the Eighth
Amendment's "cruel and unusual punishment" prohibition applicable to the states.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
43. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504-05. The Court rejected Maryland's argument to allow
victim impact statements so that the jury can consider the foreseeable, direct
consequences of the defendant's act. Id. at 503-04.
44. Id. at 506 n.8.
45. Id. at 497.
46. Id at 515 (White, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (White, J., dissenting) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976);
quoting Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
48. Fahey, supra note 4, at 221 n.95 (citing Rushing v. Butler, 868 F.2d 800, 804
7
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Booth on the grounds that a judge heard the victim statements, not a jury.49
Finally, some courts attempted to distinguish the content of the victim
statements at bar from the content of the victim statements in Booth.5 °
Despite the Court's ruling in Booth that victim statements from the family
of the victim were unconstitutional, Missouri courts have never relied on
Booth to reverse a death penalty case because of an impermissible use of
victim statements." To permit the use of victim statements, Missouri cases
have distinguished Booth in two of the above ways: either distinguishing the
(5th Cir. 1989) (only purpose of victim impact testimony was to inflame jury);
Grossman v. State, 525 So.2d 833, 842 (Fla. 1988) (holding that victim impact is an
impermissible non-statutory aggravating factor), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989);
Harris v. State, 539 A.2d 637, 640-41 (Md. 1988) (holding that victim impact
statementsviolated Booth); State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140, 143 (S.C. 1988) (finding
prosecutorial argument focusing on victim characteristics improper), aff'd, South
Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808 (1991)).
49. Fahey, supra note 4, at 221 (citing State v. Keith, 754 P.2d 474, 488 (Mont.
1988) (nothing in record indicated that judge relied on victim impact evidence); State
v. Sowell, 530 N.E.2d 1294, 1301-02 (Ohio 1988) (discussing presumption in bench
trial that judge will consider only relevant evidence), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1028
(1989)). See also State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82, 96 (Mo. 1990) (noting "[t]he
danger of [a victim impact statement] is that it may inflame the jury and divert it from
deciding the case on E' relevant evidence.. ." but holding that when a judge, rather
than a jury, hears inadmissible evidence such as victim impact statements, the court
presumes it was not prejudicial) (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881 (1991)).
50. Fahey, supra note 4, at 222 (citing People v. Ghent, 739 P.2d 1250, 1271
(Cal. 1987) (comments were "brief' and "mild" compared to Booth), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 929 (1988); People v. Jones, 528 N.E.2d 648, 666 (Ill. 1988) (finding comments
brief and directly related to the circumstances of the crime), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1040 (1989)). See also State v. Woltering, 810 S.W.2d 584, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that statements did not describe the personal characteristics of the victim or
the emotional impact on the victim's family, and were not victim impact statements
prohibited by Booth).
51. See, e.g., State v. Petary, 781 S.W.2d 534, 541 (Mo. 1989) (finding that
where defendant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, the
prosecutor's references to the victim's age, pregnant sister, their mental retardation and
the victim's family's financial problems were not impermissible because they were
relevant circumstances of the crime in the guilt and punishment stages of the trial),
vacated on other grounds, Petary v. Missouri, 494 U.S. 1075 (1990).
[Vol. 60
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content of questionable statements made by prosecutors,52 or distinguishing
by the fact that a judge was the sentencer, rather than a jury. 3
The Supreme Court applied its reasoning in Booth that victim impact
statements were cruel and unusual punishment in South Carolina v. Gathers,
also a five-to-four majority opinion. 4 The defendant in Gathers, convicted
of murdering and sexually assaulting a mentally impaired man, was sentenced
to death." Unlike the statements presented to the jury about the emotional
impact of the murder on the family of the victim in Booth, the objectionable
evidence in Gathers only concerned the character of the victim. 6
The victim in Gathers considered himself a preacher and was carrying a
booklet entitled "The Game Guy's Prayer" when he was murdered. 7  In
commenting on the piety of the victim, the prosecutor read one of the victim's
prayers to the jury. 8 The prosecutor used the prayer, which invoked sports
52. Woltering, 810 S.W.2d at 587 (citing Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1987)). The jury convicted Woltering of first degree murder and sentenced him to
life in prison without parole. Id. at 586. The court held that the statements the
prosecutor read from the victim's diary regarding some of her kitchen appliances,
sewing materials, the weather, and her buying a car were different from victim impact
statements in Booth because they did not describe the personal characteristics of the
victim or describe the emotional impact on the victim's family. Id. at 587.
See also State v. Allison, 745 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (allowing
victim to testify about threatening statements the defendant made to her on redirect by
the prosecutor in order to rehabilitate her impeached testimony, not to tell the jury the
impact of the crime on her; subsequently, the jury convicted Allison of attempted
murder and sentenced him to fifteen years in prison); Petary, 781 S.W.2d at 541.
53. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d at 96 (after lower court judge found the defendant
guilty of first degree murder and sentenced him to death, Missouri Supreme Court held
that since it was a non-jury trial, the victim impact statements were not prejudicial to
the defendant).
54. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 810 (1989).
55. Id. at 806-08.
56. Id at 811.
57. Id. at 807.
58. Id. at 809. The prayer that the prosecutor read to the jury read as follows:
Dear God, help me to be a sport in this little game of life. I don't ask for
any easy place in this lineup. Play me anywhere you need me. I only ask
you for the stuff to give you one hundred percent of what I have got. If all
the hard drives seem to come my way, I thank you for the compliment.
Help me to remember that you won't ever let anything come my way that
you and I together can't handle. And help me to take the bad break as part
of the game. Help me to understand that the game is full of knots and
knocks and trouble, and make me thankful for them. Help me to be brave
so that the harder they come the better I like it. And, oh God, help me to
always play on the square. No matter what the other players do, help me
9
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metaphors and stressed the virtue of humility, to stress the victim's
vulnerability. 9 The prosecutor also used a voter registration card found on
the victim at the murder scene to argue that the victim was an ordinary citizen,
who thought he could sit quietly on a park bench without risking death.'
The Court rejected the State's argument that the prosecutor's remarks
were distinguishable from victim impact statements because the pages of the
booklet were scattered around the crime scene and, therefore, described to the
jury the scene of the crime, not the character of the victim. 6' The Court
instead reaffirmed its precedent that victim-related evidence was
unconstitutional in capital punishment cases because "[a]llowing the jury to
rely on [victim impact statements] . . . could result in imposing the death
sentence because of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that
were irrelevant to the decision to kill."'6
Federal and state courts faced with the issue of victim statements from
family members applied Booth and Gathers to hold family impact statements
unconstitutional, and either reversed the defendant's death sentence, and/or
remanded the case with directions to impose a life sentence without parole on
the defendant. 3
to come clean. Help me to study the book so that I'll know the rules, to
study and think a lot about the greatest player that ever lived and other
players that are portrayed in the book. If they ever found out the best part
of the game was helping other guys who are out of luck, help me to find
it out, too. Help me to be regular, and also an inspiration with the other
players. Finally, oh God, if fate seems to uppercut me with both hands,
and I am laid on the shelf in sickness or old age or something, help me to
take that as part of the game, too. Help me not to whimper or squeal that
the game was a frameup or that I had a raw deal. When in falling dusk I
get the final bell, I ask for no lying, complimentary tombstones. I'd only
like to know that you feel that I have been a good guy, a good game guy,
a saint in the game of life.
Id. at 808-09.
59. Id. at 809.
60. Id. at 808.
61. Id, at 811.
62. Id. (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987)).
63. See Hayes v. Lockhart, 881 F.2d 1451 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing Booth and
Gathers and holding that victim impact statements from the victim's family were
impermissible, reversing defendant's death sentence, and remanding with instructions
to impose a life sentence without parole), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1088 (1990); Pierce
v. State, 576 So. 2d 236, 254 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (citing Booth and Gathers and
remanding the case because victim impact statements by the victim's daughter were
impermissible), cert. denied, 576 So. 2d 258 (Ala. 1991).
[Vol. 60
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C. The United States Supreme Court Reverses Its Stance
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court reversed its decisions regarding
the constitutionality of victim impact statements. In Payne v. Tennessee, the
Court overruled both Booth and Gathers with a six-to-three majority,' and
concluded that victim impact statements and arguments relating to the impact
of the crime on the victim's family are constitutional during the sentencing of
the defendant. 5
Payne was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder of a woman
and her daughter, and assault with intent to commit murder and attempted
murder of the woman's son.6 The jury sentenced Payne to death. 7
At the sentencing stage of the trial, Payne called four witnesses to testify
that he was polite, affectionate and caring; the prosecutor called the victim's
mother to testify about the effect of the murder on her grandson.68 In
closing argument, the prosecutor argued that, "[Payne's attorney] wants you
to think about a good reputation, people who love the defendant. . . [h]e
doesn't want you to think about the people who love [the victim], her mother
and daddy who loved her... [t]he brother who mourns for [his sister] every
single day and wants to know where his best little playmate is. He doesn't
have anybody to watch cartoons with him, a little one. These are the things
that go into why it is especially cruel, heinous, and atrocious, the burden that
that child will carry forever."69
In Payne, the United States Supreme Court upheld the prosecutor's use
of victim impact statements and affirmed the defendant's death sentence.70
The Court reasoned that the criminal law system has always been concerned
with the extent of harm a defendant causes when assessing blameworthiness
and sentencing the defendant.7' Accordingly, because victim statements were
relevant to the defendant's responsibility and moral guilt, the Court concluded
that victim impact evidence is another factor that the sentencer should be
allowed to consider.72
64. Payne, 501 U.S. at 830.
65. Id. at 825.
66. Id. at 814.
67. Id at 816.
68. Id. at 814.
69. Id at 816.
70. Id at 830.
71. Id at 819 ("[T]wo equally blameworthy criminal defendants may be guilty
of different offenses solely because their acts cause differing amounts of harm.").
72. Id at 808, 826.
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D. Current Treatment of Victim Impact Statements
Forty-nine states currently allow the sentencer to consider some form of
victim impact statements in non-capital punishment cases. 3  Most
jurisdictions, including Missouri, the District of Columbia and the federal
court system, are closely aligned with the United States Supreme Court
decision in Payne and permit victim statements from the victim's family
regarding the impact of the victim's death on the family.74 Of the states that
73. See infra notes 74-75.
74. The following state statutes, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
specifically provide for victim impact statements taken from the victim's family:
ALASKA STAT. §§ 12.55.022, 12.55.185 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-702
(Supp. 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-65-102, 5-65-109 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1191.1 (West Supp. 1994); COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 24-4.1-302, 24-4.1-
302.5 (Supp. 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-220 (West 1994); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11 § 4331 (Supp. 1993); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-103 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.143 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-1.1 (Harrison Supp. 1994);
IDAHO CODE § 19-5306(1)(b)(3) (Supp. 1994) (see State v. Wersland, 873 P.2d 144
(Idaho 1994) (holding impact statements from victim's parents were admissible)); 725
ILL. COM. STAT. ANN. 120/6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1995); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-I-
8.5 (Bums Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 8-1019 (Supp. 1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 421.500, 421.520
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp. 1994); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 875(B) (West
Supp. 1994); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 6101, tit. 17A § 1257 (West Supp. 1994);
MD. ANN. CODE of 1957 art. 41, § 4-609 (1993); MASS. GEN. L. ANN. ch. 258B,
§ 3(p) (West Supp. 1994); MICH. COM. LAWS ANN. §§ 780.752,780.791 (West Supp.
1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 611A.01, 611A.037 (West Supp. 1994); MIss. CODE
ANN. § 99-19-151, et seq. (Supp. 1994) (bound); Mo. REV. STAT. § 217.762 (1994);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-112 (Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2261
(1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-a (Supp. 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-6
(West Supp. 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-26-3, 31-26-4 (Michie Supp. 1994); N.Y.
CRim. PROC. § 390.30(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-825
(1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-34-01, 12.1-34-02(14) (1993); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 2947.051, 2929.12 (Anderson Supp. 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§§ 982, 984 (West Supp. 1995); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 137.530(3), 144.790(3) (1993);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, P.S. § 180-9.3 (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAws § 12-28-3
(1993); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1550 (Law. Co-op. 1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN.
§ 23A-28C-1 (Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-35-207, 40-38-203 (1994); TEX.
CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 56.03 (West Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 7006
(Supp. 1993); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.5, 19.2-299.1 (Michie 1994); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 7.69.020,7.69.030 (West Supp. 1994); W. VA. CODE §§ 61-1 1A-2, 61-
llA-3 (1995); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 950.04 (West 1994); Wyo. STAT. §§ 7-21-101, 7-
13-303 (1994).
Hawaii does not have a statute or any case law addressing the constitutionality
of victim impact statements.
[Vol. 60
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allow victim statements from family members, Idaho requires that the
statements are used only in non-death penalty cases. Other states that allow
impact statements from family members impose various other limitations on
their use, most typically requiring that: (1) the statements must be general and
cannot delve into the victim's character and worth; (2) the statements must be
read by the prosecutor, and not in the form of testimony from family
members; (3) the statements cannot be unduly prejudicial to the defendant; (4)
the statements must adhere to victim impact statement forms; and (5) the
statements can be used only when a judge, instead of a jury, is sentencing the
defendant.7 6 Only two states do not provide for victim impact statements
from family members of victims, and only allow victim statements from the
victim.
77
Prior to Wise, only one Missouri death penalty case followed Payne in
permitting victim impact statements.78 In this case, however, the prosecutor
75. See State v. Bivens, 803 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991) (in the
absence of the death penalty, the court may consider victim impact statements during
sentencing); State v. Wersland, 873 P.2d 144, 146 (Idaho 1994) (impact statements
from victim's parents were admissible in a non-death penalty case) (citing IDAHO
CODE § 19-5306(l)(b)(3) (Supp. 1994)).
76. Missouri requires that the statements must be general and cannot delve into
the victim's character. See Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 516. In Iowa, victim impact
statements from family are permissible, but the defendant may not be unduly
prejudiced. See State v. Sumpter, 438 N.W.2d 6, 9 (Iowa 1989). The Iowa and Texas
statutes regarding victim impact statements also require that victim impact from the
victim's family comply with victim impact forms. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 901.3
(West Supp. 1994); TEX. CRIM. PRO. CODE ANN. § 56.03 (West Supp. 1995). Kansas,
New Hampshire and Pennsylvania allow victim impact statements from the victim's
family only if a judge, and not a jury, is sentencing the defendant. See State v. Hill,
799 P.2d 997, 999 (Kan. 1990); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:4-a (Supp. 1993); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 71, P.S. § 180-9.3 (Supp. 1994).
77. The Alabama and Nevada victim impact statutes do not provide for victim
impact statements taken from the victim's family. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 26.3 (1993);
NEv. REv. STAT. § 176.145 (Supp. 1993).
Vermont does not have a statute addressing victim impact statements, but a 1993
Vermont Supreme Court case allowed impact statements from victims of sexual
assault. See State v. Densmore, 624 A.2d 1138, 1142 (Vt. 1993).
Hawaii does not have a statute or any case law addressing the constitutionality
of victim impact statements.
78. See State v. Griffin, 848 S.W.2d 464, 471 (Mo. 1993) (citing both Booth and
Payne and holding that the victim impact statements regarding the defendant's victims
were vague, general and brief, and not impermissible); see also State v. Hunter, 840
S.W.2d 850, 867 (Mo. 1992). In Hunter, a judge convicted the defendant of first
degree murder and first degree robbery and sentenced him to death. The prosecutor
read the statements of the victim's step sister and half sister to the judge. Id. at 867
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read victim impact statements which made "vague, general and brief"
reference to the defendant's victims, and not to the victims' families. 9
Missouri courts more commonly circumvented Payne by scrutinizing
n.4. The step sister stated that she hoped that justice would be done. Id. The half
sister stated that she didn't know the victim, but this shouldn't happen to anyone and
she hoped the defendant got the death penalty. Id. Without referring to Payne, the
court held that: (1) the victim impact statements were so innocuous that they were
unlikely to inflame a person with an ordinary temperament; and (2) the inherent danger
in victim impact statements was minimized because the judge, and not the jury,
sentenced the defendant. Id. at 867.
The Missouri death penalty provides:
1. In all cases of murder in the first degree for which the death
penalty is authorized, the judge in ajury-waived trial shall consider, or he
shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider:
(1) Whether a statutory aggravating circumstance or
circumstances enumerated in subsection 2 of this section is established by
the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; and
(2) If a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances is
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the evidence as a whole justifies
a sentence of death or a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for
probation, parole or release except by act of the governor. In determining
the issues enumerated in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection, the trier
shall consider all evidence which it finds to be in aggravation or mitigation
of punishment, including evidence received during the first stage of the trial
and evidence supporting any of the statutory aggravating or mitigating
circumstances set out in subsections 2 and 3 of this section. If the trier is
a jury, it shall not be instructed upon any specific evidence which may be
in aggravation or mitigation of punishment, but shall be instructed that each
juror shall consider any evidence which he considers to be aggravating or
mitigating.
2. Statutory aggravating circumstances for a murder in the first degree
offense shall be limited to the following:
(1) The offense was committed by a person with a prior record
of conviction for murder in the first degree, or the offense was committed
by a person who has one or more serious assaultive criminal convictions;
Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.032 (1994). The statute continues by listing aggravating
'circumstances and does not mention victim impact statements. Id.
79. The Missouri Supreme Court tried to distinguish the case from Booth, by
noting that Booth only "applies to 'the presence or absence of emotional distress of the
victims families, or the victim's personal characteristics,' or 'emotionally charged
opinions as to what conclusions the jury should draw from the evidence .... "' Griffin,
848 S.W.2d at 471 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 507, 509). The court found that the
prosecutor's references to the defendant's victims were not commentaries on the
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testimony purporting to be victim impact, and concluding that it simply did
not qualify as victim impact evidence. 0
Since its decision in Wise, however, the Missouri Supreme Court has
reaffirmed its position on victim impact statements and used both Wise and
Payne to uphold the use of victim impact statements in State v. Parker."'
The jury convicted Parker of first-degree murder and sentenced him to
death.82 The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the statements of a victim's
father regarding how the family had been impacted by the victim's death.83
The court reasoned that, "[v]ictim impact evidence illustrates the harm from
the murder; there is nothing unfair about permitting the jury to consider that
harm, along with defendant's mitigating evidence.""
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The decision in Wise was the first Missouri case to address the question
of whether victim impact statements from the victim's family are
constitutional in death penalty cases." Wise's argument against impact
statements from his victim's family was two-fold: first, he asserted that
Article I, §21 of the Missouri Constitution creates a per se prohibition against
victim impact evidence; 6 second, he asserted that the victim statements
violated his federal constitutional rights to due process and to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment.8
80. See State v. Shum, 866 S.W.2d 447, 470 (Mo. 1992) (holding that evidence
of the victim's religious nature was not victim impact, and thus, was permissible);
State v. Ramsey, 864 S.W.2d 320, 333 (Mo. 1993) (holding that photographs of the
victim's dolls and stuffed animals, photographs of the victim's children and
photographs and cards from the victim's wallet were not victim impact evidence); see
also State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Mo. 1992) (holding that admitting into
evidence prosecutor's statements characterizing the victim as a "helpless paraplegic"
was not plain error).
81. 886 S.W.2d 908, 927 (Mo. 1994).
82. Id. at 916.
83. Id. at 927 (father testified as to the tension and concern that the family felt
about the trial). The court also upheld the introduction into evidence of a photograph
of the victim and her daughter. Id.
84. Id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 826-28 (1991)) (reasoning that
the father's statements were not comments about the jury's verdict, but were evidence
of the impact of the crime on the family).
85. Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 515.
86. Id The Missouri Constitution provides in pertinent part "that excessive bail
shall not be required , nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment
inflicted." MO CONST., Art. 1, § 21 (1945).
87. Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 515.
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The court unanimously rejected both of Wise's arguments and upheld his
death sentence." First, the court noted that the Missouri Constitution's
limitation on victim impact evidence is analogous to the Eighth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, which, according to Payne, does not impose
a per se bar against victim impact statements.8 9
The court addressed Wise's second argument regarding cruel and unusual
punishment with little analysis, affirming that under both the United States and
Missouri constitutions, victim impact evidence may be relevant and admissible
at the penalty stage of the trial.' The court did, however, recognize that
victim impact evidence violates the Eighth Amendment if it is, "so unduly
prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair[,]"'" but did not find
undue prejudice in this case. The court noted that:
The prosecutor's references to victim impact here were brief, light, and
general.92 The prosecutor did not delve into the victim's personal
characteristics or relative worth. No family members testified as to their
loss or emotional distress. The statements did not remove reason from the
sentencing process, nor did they inject caprice and emotion. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's objections.93
V. COMMENT
Victim impact evidence from a victim's family is a relatively new and
controversial concept in criminal law. Regardingly, state statutes restrict
victim impact statements in various ways. 94
Arguably, victim impact statements inject an arbitrary factor in deciding
whether to impose the death penalty.95  Opponents of victim impact
88. Id. at 525.
89. Id. at 515 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)).
90. Id. at 515-16 ("A State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the
victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the
jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.") (quoting
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)) (citing State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503,
511 (Mo. 1992)).
91. Id. at 516 (citing Payne, 501 U.S. at 825).
92. The prosecutor never actually read victim impact statements, however,
because the defense objected on the basis of Booth and Gathers. State v. Wise, No.
583113 (St. Louis Circuit Court, St. Louis County, Div. 19, March 15, 1991).
93. Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 516.
94. See supra notes 75-77 for examples of statutory restrictions on victim impact
statements.
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statements in capital punishment cases also contend that they impermissibly
inflame and prejudice the jury.96 In addition, the reliability of victim impact
statements is suspect because victim impact statements are difficult to verify
and impossible for the defendant to rebut.9 A defendant's sentence should
solely be based on the severity of the crime and the defendant's record, not
on the emotional impact of the victim's family. 8
Proponents of victim impact statements contend that the impact of the
crime should be a factor in determining a defendant's sentence. Accordingly,
proponents maintain that presentation of victim impact statements during
sentencing appropriately allows the sentencer to reflect upon and account for
the effect of the defendant's crime on the victim's family. Victim impact
statements are also important because prosecutors are not as apt as victims to
convey the impact of the crime to the sentencer. Although the prosecution
uses the victim's testimony to put on its case, the interests of the prosecution
and of the victim are not congruent. The prosecution mainly strives for a
conviction. In contrast, a victim, or a victim's family, seek retribution, and
a means of coping and closure. Thus, because victim impact statements are
the only method by which to convey the crime's impact on the victim, or the
victim's family, they are essential in admitting the crime's impact on the
record." Allowing the victim a voice in the proceeding also creates a sense
of fairness. Foremost, victim impact statements vindicate victims' rights.
Although they are diametrically opposed, both defendants' and victims'
rights can be safeguarded. If victim impact statements are read after the
sentencing stage of the trial, both defendants' and victims' rights remain
intact. Accordingly, the risk of arbitrary sentencing would be eliminated, and
victims would still be a part of the criminal proceeding by having voiced their
feelings to the defendant, the court and the public. Victim impact statements
should be a part of the defendant's sentence, not a factor in deciding an
appropriate sentence. 00
96. Fahey, supra note 4, at 220.
97. Christine D. Marton, The Admissibility of Victim Impact Evidence at the
Sentencing Phase of a Capital Trial, 31 DuQ. L. REv. 801, 805 (1993).
98. Id.
99. Martha Hoffman, Victim Impact Statement, 10 WESTERN ST. UNIV. L. REV.
221, 227 (1983) (victim impact statements help victims regain control over their lives,
and allow victims to "get [the] ordeal off [of their] chest[s] and onto the record").
100. See, e.g., State v. Rasinski, 464 N.W.2d 517, 525 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(court imposed probationary requirement that the defendant: (1) read victim impact
statements submitted by the victims' families; and (2) write a letter of apology to the
families).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court pronounced that victim impact statements were cruel
and unusual punishment in 1987.0 ' The Court affirmed that victim impact
statements were cruel and unusual in 1989. '02 Currently, however, after the
Supreme Court reversed its stance in 1991,"03 almost all states allow the jury
to consider victim impact statements during sentencing in capital punishment
trials.' 4 Curiously, victim impact statements, once thought to be cruel and
unusual punishment, are widely used in our criminal justice system to sentence
criminals.
The criminal justice system could better utilize victim impact statements
by requiring the defendant to listen to the statements as part of his or her
sentence. The system would thereby preserve a place for victim impact in the
courtroom, and safeguard against cruel and unusual punishment.
CARRIE L. MULHOLLAND
101. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509.
102. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811.
103. Payne, 501 U.S., at 830.
104. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
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